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REFORMS MEET FAIRNESS CONCERNS IN SCHOOL
AND COLLEGE ADMISSIONS
SOMOUAOGA BONKOUNGOU AND ALEXANDER NESTEROV
Abstract. Recently, many matching systems around the world have been re-
formed. These reforms responded to objections that the matching mechanisms
in use were unfair and manipulable. Surprisingly, the mechanisms remained unfair
even after the reforms: the new mechanisms may induce an outcome with a blocking
student who desires and deserves a school which she did not receive.
However, as we show in this paper, the reforms introduced matching mechanisms
which are more fair compared to the counterfactuals. First, most of the reforms
introduced mechanisms that are more fair by stability : whenever the old mechanism
does not have a blocking student, the new mechanism does not have a blocking
student either. Second, some reforms introduced mechanisms that are more fair by
counting : the old mechanism always has at least as many blocking students as the
new mechanism.
These findings give a novel rationale to the reforms and complement the recent
literature showing that the same reforms have introduced less manipulable matching
mechanisms. We further show that the fairness and manipulability of the mecha-
nisms are strongly logically related.
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1. Introduction
In the last decades, there has been a wave of reforms of matching systems around
the world, ranging from college admissions systems in Chinese provinces, secondary
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REFORMS AND FAIRNESS 2
public school admissions systems in multiple districts in Ghana, to public school
admissions systems in multiple cities in the US and in the UK.
The old matching systems were criticized because they were vulnerable to gaming
and were unfair. The most vivid example is, perhaps, the 2007 major reform in Eng-
land, which covers 146 local school admissions systems. According to the Secretary of
State, Alan Johnson, the aim of the reform was to “ensure that admission authorities
– whether local authorities or schools – operate in a fair way” (School Admissions
Code, 2007). The reform prohibited the practice of giving “priority to children ac-
cording to the order of other schools named as preference by their parents,” known as
the first-preference-first principle. According to this principle, a student who ranks a
school higher in her list, receives a higher admission priority at this school compared
to the students who rank this school lower. Prior to the reform, as many as one third
of the schools in England used this principle.
In 2009, the Chicago authorities replaced the so-called Boston mechanism that
used the same first-preference-first principle for each selective high school, arguing
that, due to this principle “high-scoring kids were being rejected simply because of
the order in which they listed their college prep preferences” (Pathak and So¨nmez,
2013). The same mechanism has been in use for college admission in all provinces
in China. It raised similar complaints. For example, one parent said: “My child has
been among the best students in his school and school district. He achieved a score
of 632 in the college entrance exam last year. Unfortunately, he was not accepted by
his first choice. After his first choice rejected him, his second and third choices were
already full. My child had no choice but to repeat his senior year” (Chen and Kesten,
2017; Nie, 2007).
The two complaints above illustrate an unfairness issue with the first-preference-
first principle. This principle can induce a matching with a so-called blocking student,
that is, a student who prefers a school over her matching while at least one seat of
this school has been assigned to a student with a lower priority (or even left empty).
The blocking student desires and deserves this seat, yet she has not been assigned to
it. A matching with no blocking student is called stable. We use these two concepts
to compare the mechanisms before and after each reform.
The first fairness criterion is stability. We compare the mechanisms at each in-
stance, taking the preferences as the reports. A mechanism is more fair by sta-
bility than a second mechanism if it induces a stable matching whenever the second
mechanism induces a stable matching, and the reverse is not true. Namely, for some
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Reforms From To
more fair
by stability?
more fair
by counting?
Arbitrary
priority
Common
priority
Arbitrary
priority
Common
priority
UK(54), 2007/11 FPF k GSk notcomparable more
not
comparable
not
comparable
Chicago, 2009
UK(4), 2007 β
k GSk more more notcomparable
not
comparable
Chicago, 2010
Ghana, 2007/08
UK(2), 2010
GSk GSk+1 more more more more
China(13), 2001/12 β Ch(e) more more notcomparable
not
comparable
Table 1. Comparison of the matching mechanisms by fairness criteria.
Notes: Each row compares the mechanism in the third column to the mechanism in the second
column with respect to fairness by stability and fairness by counting. Common priority is a special
case of arbitrary priority. The complete list of the the UK local matching systems and Chinese
provinces that underwent the reforms can be found in Pathak and So¨nmez (2013) and,
respectively, in Chen and Kesten (2017).
markets this mechanism induces a stable matching, while the second mechanism does
not.
Our main results using this criterion support that most of the reforms have adopted
matching mechanisms that are more fair by stability (see Table 1). For example, in
China, this is true for half of its provinces (Chen and Kesten, 2017). In Chicago,
the mechanism adopted after the 2009 reform is more fair by stability than the one
previously used (Theorem 1); the one adopted after the 2010 reform is also more fair
by stability than the mechanism adopted in 2009 (Theorem 2).
The only exception is the 2007 reform in England in the districts where only some
of the schools used the first-preference-first principle. For each of these districts, there
are instances where the matching was stable under the old mechanism but yet is not
under the new mechanism (Example 1). However, we restored the result when schools
in such a district have a common priority order (e.g., based on students’ grades or
a single lottery), that is, the mechanism adopted after the reform is more fair by
stability than the one previously used (Proposition 1).
We formulated a second fairness criterion based on counting the number of blocking
students. A mechanism ismore fair by counting (the number of blocking students)
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than a second mechanism if for each instance the second mechanism has at least as
many blocking students as the first mechanism. This criterion implies the previous
one.
Our main result for this criterion supports few reforms showing that the mechanisms
adopted after these reforms are more fair by counting than the ones used before (see
Table 1). Broadly, these reforms involve extending ranking constraints in the Gale-
Shapley mechanism. The Gale-Shapley mechanism with a shorter ranking constraint
has more, or an equal number of, blocking students than the Gale-Shapley mechanism
with a longer ranking constraint (Theorem 4). This reform took place in Chicago
(2010), in Ghana (2007, 2008), in Newcastle (2010), and Surrey (2010) (Pathak and
So¨nmez, 2013). But the criterion is too demanding for the other reforms. We provide
a counterexample showing that after these reforms the number of blocking students
may increase (examples 3,4).
Overall, our results provide a new justification for the reforms, complementing the
existing ones. Pathak and So¨nmez (2013) were the first to observe these reforms
and proposed a way to explain them using a notion of manipulability that compares
mechanisms according to the inclusion of instances where they are not vulnerable
to gaming. These results were further strengthened for other mechanisms and other
vulnerability criteria (Chen and Kesten, 2017; Decerf and Van der Linden, 2018; Dur
et al., 2018; Bonkoungou and Nesterov, 2020).
We also find a logical relationship between stability and manipulability. Under the
constrained Gale-Shapley mechanism, when its outcome is stable the mechanism is
not manipulable; while for the constrained Boston mechanism, when the mechanism
is not manipulable, its outcome is stable (Corollary 1 and Figure 1). For the serial
dictatorship mechanism used in Chicago after 2009, the two concepts are equivalent:
its outcome at an instance is stable if and only if the mechanism is not manipulable
at this instance (Proposition 2).
Another interesting example of the relationship between stability and manipula-
bility is the reform in England. After this reform, the mechanisms in most school
districts did not become less manipulable (Bonkoungou and Nesterov, 2020); they
also did not become more fair by stability either (Example 1 below). However, for
each instance, the reform was successful according to at least one of the two criteria
(Proposition 3): if the reform disrupted fairness — by producing an unstable matching
while it was stable before the reform — the new matching is not vulnerable to gaming.
Thus, at these instances, the mechanisms were not vulnerable after the reform.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next, we briefly review the related
literature not mentioned earlier. We then describe the model in section 2. We present
the results on the comparisons in section 3 and on the relationship between stability
and manipulability in section 4. We present all the proofs in the appendix.
Related literature. Apart from the papers studying the reforms mentioned earlier
(Pathak and So¨nmez, 2013; Chen and Kesten, 2017; Decerf and Van der Linden, 2018;
Bonkoungou and Nesterov, 2020) the recent literature has been interested in other
ways to compare mechanism by fairness and stability.
Among the strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms, the Gale’s Top Trading
Cycles mechanism (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) is the most fair by stability when each
school has one seat (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2019). This result also holds for other
fairness comparisons, such as the set of blocking students (Dogan and Ehlers, 2020b)
and the set of blocking triplets (i, j, s) – student i blocking the matching of school s
and student j (Kwon and Shorrer, 2019). In fact, the result holds for each stability
comparison that satisfies few basic properties (Dogan and Ehlers, 2020b).
Among the Pareto efficient mechanisms, the most fair by stability is the Efficiency-
adjusted Deferred Acceptance mechanism (EADA) due to Kesten (2010) – both in
terms of blocking pairs and blocking triplets (Dogan and Ehlers, 2020a; Tang and
Zhang, 2020; Kwon and Shorrer, 2019). Independent from the present work, Dogan
and Ehlers (2020a) also use the fairness by counting criterion to show that among
efficient mechanisms EADA is not the most fair by counting, unless the priority profile
satisfies few acyclicity conditions. To our knowledge, this is the only paper that uses
the number of blocking students as a measure of fairness.
The first paper that studied the constrained mechanisms is Haeringer and Klijn
(2009). They study the stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes of the game in-
duced by these mechanisms. The most important insight is that the Nash equilibrium
outcomes of the constrained Boston mechanism are all stable, while the Nash equilib-
rium outcomes of constrained Gale-Shapley may not be all stable.1 In addition, the
Nash equilibrium outcomes of a constrained Gale-Shapley are subset of the Nash equi-
librium outcomes of any constrained Gale-Shapley with longer list. Therefore, when
the Nash equilibrium outcomes the constrained Gale-Shapley with longer list are all
stable, the Nash equilibrium outcomes of the constrained Gale-Shapley with shorter
list are also stable. Our results do not contradict the spirit of the previous results
1Ergin and So¨nmez (2006) also showed that the Nash equilibrium outcomes of the Boston mechanism
are stable.
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because in Nash equilibrium students are best responding such that the equilibrium
behavior alters the fairness properties of the mechanisms.
2. Model
In a school choice model (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999; Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez,
2003), there is a finite and non-empty set I of students with a generic element i and
a finite and non-empty set S of schools with a generic element s.
Each student i has a strict preference relation Pi over S ∪ {∅}, where ∅ represents
the outside option for this student. For each student i, let Ri denote the “at least as
good as” relation associated with Pi.2 School s is acceptable to student i if s Pi ∅; and
it is unacceptable to student i if ∅ Pi s. The list P = (Pi)i∈I is a preference profile.
Given a proper subset I ′ ( I of students, we will often write a preference profile as
P = (PI′ , P−I′) to emphasize the components for the students in I ′.
Each school s has a strict priority order s over the set I of students, and a
capacity qs (a natural number indicating the number of its available seats). The list
= (s)s∈S is a priority profile and q = (qs)s∈S is a capacity vector. We extend each
priority order s of school s to the set 2I of subsets of students and assume that this
extension is responsive to the priority order s over I as follows. The priority order
s of school s is responsive (Roth, 1986) if
• for each i, j ∈ I and each I ′ ⊂ I \ {i, j} such that |I ′|< qs − 1, we have, (i)
I ′ ∪ {i} s I ′, and (ii) I ′ ∪ {i} s I ′ ∪ {j} if and only if i s j and
• for each I ′ ⊂ I such that |I ′|> qs, we have ∅ s I ′.
The tuple (I, S, P,, q) is a school choice problem. We assume that there are more
students than schools, that is, |I|> |S|. The set of students and the set of schools are
fixed throughout the paper, and we denote the school choice problem by the triple
(P,, q), or even by the preference profile P only.
A matching µ is a function µ : I → S∪{∅} such that for each school s, |µ−1(s)|≤ qs.
If µ(i) 6= ∅, then we say that student i is matched under µ. If µ(i) = ∅, then we say
that she is unmatched under µ.
Let (P,, q) be a problem. A matching µ is individually rational under P if for
each student i, µ(i) Ri ∅. A pair (i, s) of a student and a school blocks the matching
µ under (P,, q) if s Pi µ(i) and either there is a student j such that µ(j) = s and
i s j or |µ−1(s)|< qs. Student i is a blocking student for the matching µ under
2That is, for each s, s′ ∈ S ∪ {∅}, s Ri s′ if and only s Pi s′ or s = s′.
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(P,, q) if there is a school s such that the pair (i, s) blocks µ under (P,, q). A
matching µ is stable under (P,, q) if it is individually rational under P and no pair
of a student and a school blocks it.
A mechanism ϕ is a function which maps each school choice problem to a match-
ing. For each problem (P,, q), let ϕi(P,, q) denote the component for student
i. A mechanism is individually rational if for each problem (P,, q), ϕ(P,, q) is
individually rational under P . Given a mechanism ϕ and a problem (P,, q), we say
that ϕ(P,, q) is stable whenever ϕ(P,, q) is stable under (P,, q).
2.1. Mechanisms. We are interested in the mechanisms that were used either before
or after the reforms. We first describe the unconstrained versions.
Gale-Shapley. Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that for each problem, there exists a
stable matching. In addition, there is a student-optimal stable matching, which is a
matching that each student finds at least as good as any other stable matching. For
each problem (P,, q), this matching can be found via the Gale and Shapley (1962)
student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm.
• Step 1: Each student applies to her most-preferred acceptable school (if any).
If a student did not rank any school acceptable, then she remains unmatched.
Each school s considers its applicants I1s at this step and tentatively accepts
min(qs, |I1s |) of the s-highest priority applicants and rejects the remaining
ones. Let A1s denote the set of students whom school s has tentatively accepted
at this step.
• Step t(t > 1): Each student, who is rejected at step t − 1, applies to her
most-preferred acceptable school among those which have not yet rejected her
(if any). If a student does not have any remaining acceptable school, then she
remains unmatched. Each school s considers the set At−1s ∪I ts, where I ts are its
new applicants at this step, and tentatively accepts min(qs, |At−1s ∪ I ts|) of the
s-highest priority applicants and rejects the remaining ones. Let Ats denote
the set of students whom school s has tentatively accepted at this step.
The algorithm stops when every student is either accepted at some step or has applied
to all of her acceptable schools. The tentative acceptances become final at this step.
Let GS(P,, q) denote the matching obtained.
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Serial Dictatorship. When schools have the same priority order, we call the Gale-
Shapley mechanism the serial dictatorship mechanism.3 Let SD(P,, q) denote the
matching assigned by the serial dictatorship mechanism to the problem (P,, q).
First-Preference-First. The schools are exogenously divided into two subsets Sfpf ⊂
S and Sep ⊂ S such that they are disjoint and Sfpf ∪ Sep = S. The set Seq is a set
of equal-preference schools and Sfpf is a set of first-preference-first schools.
The First-Preference-First mechanism (FPF) assigns to each problem (P,, q), the
matching GS(P, ˆ, q), where the priority order of each equal-preference school is
maintained intact while the priority order of each first-preference-first school is ad-
justed according to the rank that students have assigned to this school. Formally, the
priority profile ˆ is obtained as follows:
1. for each equal-preference school s ∈ Sep, ˆs =s and
2. for each first-preference-first school s ∈ Sfpf , ˆs is defined as follows. Let I1(s)
be the set of students who have ranked school s first under P , I2(s) the set of students
who have ranked school s second under P , and so on. Note that we count the ranking
of ∅ as well.
• for each `, k ∈ {1, . . . , |S|+1} such that ` > k and each students i, j such that
i ∈ Ik(s) and j ∈ I`(s), i ˆs j.
• for each k ∈ {1, . . . , |S|+1} and each i, j ∈ Ik(s), i ˆs j if and only if i s j.
Let FPF (P,, q) denote the matching assigned to the problem (P,, q).
Boston. Until 2005, the Boston public school system was using an immediate accep-
tance mechanism called the Boston mechanism (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003).
This mechanism assigns to each problem (P,, q), the matching as described in the
following algorithm.
• Step 1: Each student applies to her most-preferred acceptable school (if any).
Each school s, considers its applicants I1s at this step and immediately accepts
min(qs, |I1s |) of the s-highest priority applicants and rejects the remaining
ones. For each school s, let q1s = qs−min(qs, |I1s |) denote its remaining capacity
after this step.
• Step t: (t > 1) Each student who is rejected at step t − 1, applies to her
most-preferred acceptable school among those which have not yet rejected
her (if any). Each school s considers its new applicants I ts at this step and
3According to our definition, a mechanism has as a domain the set of all problems — including
problems where schools have different priorities.
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immediately accepts min(qt−1s , |I ts|) of the s-highest priority applicants and
rejects the remaining ones. For each school s, let qts = qt−1 − min(qt−1s , |I ts|)
denote its remaining capacity after this step.
The algorithm stops when every student is either accepted at some step or has
applied to all of her acceptable schools. Let β(P,, q) denote the matching assigned
by the Boston mechanism to the problem (P,, q).
Remark. In the (algorithm of the) Boston mechanism, students applying to the same
school at each step have assigned the same rank to it. Therefore, students applying to a
school at a given step of the algorithm rank this school higher than those applying to it
at any step after. In particular, no student could be rejected by a school while another
student, who has assigned a lower rank to it, is accepted. Thus, the Boston mecha-
nism is a first-preference-first mechanism where every school is a first-preference-first
school. This result follows from the Proposition 2 of Pathak and So¨nmez (2008).
Constrained mechanisms. Haeringer and Klijn (2009) first observed that in practice,
students are allowed to report a limited number of schools. This means that schools
that are listed below a certain position are not considered. Let k ∈ {1, . . . , |S|}. For
each student i, the truncation after the k’th acceptable school (if any) of the preference
relation Pi with x acceptable schools is the preference relation P ki with min(x, k)
acceptable schools such that all schools are ordered as in Pi. Let P k = (P ki )i∈I . The
constrained version ϕk of the mechanism ϕ is the mechanism that assigns to each
problem (P,, q) the matching ϕ(P k,, q). That is, ϕk(P,, q) = ϕ(P k,, q).
Chinese parallel. Chen and Kesten (2017) describe a parametric mechanism that
many Chinese provinces have been using. The parameter e ≥ 1 is a natural number.
For each problem (P,, q), the outcome is a sequential application of constrained
GS. In the first round, the matching is final for matched students under GSe(P,
, q), while unmatched students proceed to the next round. In the next round, each
school reduces its capacity by the number of students assigned to it in the last round,
each matched student replaces her preferences with a preference relation where she
finds no school acceptable and the unmatched students (in the previous round) are
matched according to GS2e for the reduced capacities and the new preference profile.
The process continues until either no school has a remaining seat or no unmatched
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student finds a school with a remaining seat acceptable. Let Ch(e)(P,, q) denote
the matching assigned by the mechanism to (P,, q).4
3. Results
3.1. Fairness by stability. Our starting point is a comparison according to the set
inclusion of the problems where mechanisms are stable.
Definition 1 (Chen and Kesten, 2017). Mechanism ϕ′ is more fair by stability
than ϕ if
(i) at each problem where ϕ is stable, ϕ′ is also stable and
(ii) there exists a problem where ϕ′ is stable but ϕ is not.
Although this criterion is less demanding, in the sense that it does not take into
account the problems where mechanisms produce unstable outcomes, it does not
explain all reforms. Indeed, it does not explain many changes that followed the 2007
reform in the UK. Indeed, the constrained First-Preference-First mechanism is not
comparable to the constrained Gale-Shapley mechanism according to this concept.
We demonstrate this in the following example.
Example 1. Let I = {i1, . . . , i7} and S = {s1, . . . , s5}. Let school s3 be a (the only)
first-preference-first school. Let (P,, q) be a problem where each school has one seat
and the remaining components are specified as follows. The sign
... indicates that the
remaining part is arbitrary.
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 Pi4 Pi5 Pi6 Pi7 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
s1 s1 s4 s1 s2 s1 s5 i4 i5 i3 i1 i7
s2 s3 s3 s2 s1 s2 s1
...
... i1 i6
...
s3 ∅ ∅ s3 s3 s5 s2 i2 i3
s4 ∅ ∅ s3 ∅ ... ...
∅ s4
∅
The outcomes of the constrained First-Preference-First FPF 4 and the constrained
Gale-Shapley GS4 at (P,, q) are specified as follows:
FPF 4(P,, q) =
(
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7
s4 ∅ s3 s1 s2 ∅ s5
)
,
4This definition of the Chinese parallel mechanisms is given only for the symmetric version where
each round has the same length e. See Chen and Kesten (2017) for details.
REFORMS AND FAIRNESS 11
GS4(P,, q) =
(
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7
s3 ∅ s4 s1 s2 ∅ s5
)
.
The matching FPF 4(P,, q) is stable.5 However, the matching GS4(P,, q) is not
stable. Indeed, the pair (i6, s4) blocks this matching because student i6 is unmatched
and finds school s4 acceptable, but student i3 is matched to s4 while i6 s4 i3.
The intuition is that the constraint in GS shortened the chains of the rejections
needed to reach a stable matching in the Gale-Shapley algorithm. For example, student
i3 is temporarily matched to school s4 at some step of the algorithm. At the student-
optimal stable matching for (P,, q), school s4 is assigned to student i1. However, we
need an application of student i1 at that school to displace student i3 from s4. This
does not occur under GS4 because no student initiates the rejection chain. However,
under FPF 4, the application of student i2 at school s3 causes the rejection of student
i1 at s3 (student i2 has ranked it higher than i1 and school s3 is a first-preference-first
school). This is the rejection needed to reach the student-optimal stable matching.
In this example, we illustrate how the constrained GS mechanism has shortened
the chains needed to reach a stable matching. It is well known that this type of
chains cause welfare losses of the unconstrained GS (Kesten, 2010).6 However, under
the Boston mechanism, (where all schools are first-preference-first schools) there is
no such chain. The following result is an implication of this fact.
Theorem 1. Suppose that there are at least two schools and let k > 1. The con-
strained Gale-Shapley mechanism GSk is more fair by stability than the constrained
Boston mechanism βk.
See the appendix for the proof. Similarly, when schools have a common priority
order, there is no such chain in the Gale-Shapley mechanism. We restore the result
for this case.
Proposition 1. Suppose that there are at least two schools and at least one first-
preference-first school, and let k > 1. The constrained serial dictatorship mechanism
SDk is more fair by stability than the constrained First-Preference-First mechanism
FPF k.
5Note that this matching is the student (and school)-optimal stable matching.
6These chains are initiated by the so-called interrupters. These are students who initiate chains of
rejections which return to them (Kesten, 2010).
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See the appendix for the proof. The constrained GS with shorter and longer lists
mechanisms can also be compared with this criterion. However, the intuition for this
result is different. When the constrained Gale-Shapley with shorter lists is stable, the
restriction has no effect on the outcome.
Lemma 1. Let (P,, q) be a problem and k > 1. Then GSk(P,, q) is stable if and
only if GSk(P,, q) = GS(P,, q).
See the appendix for the proof. Then, when the constraint in GSk does not affect
the outcome, the longer constraint in GSk+1 will not affect the outcome either.
Theorem 2. Suppose that there are at least three schools and let k > ` where k is less
than the number of schools and ` ≥ 1. Then, the constrained Gale-Shapley mechanism
GSk is more fair by stability than GS`.
See the appendix for the proof. Finally, we consider the Chinese mechanisms.
These mechanisms are known to be comparable in terms of fairness by stability, but
only in case one tier is a multiple of another (Chen and Kesten, 2017). We present
this result for completeness.
Theorem 3 (Chen and Kesten, 2017). For each e ≥ 1,m > 1, the Chinese mechanism
Ch(me) is more fair by stability than Ch(e).
3.2. Fairness by counting. In this section we present the results for a stronger
comparison criterion. Unlike the previous notion, we compare the number of blocking
students. Therefore, the mechanisms are compared for all problems (even where they
induce unstable outcomes).
Definition 2. An individually rational mechanism ϕ′ is more fair by counting
(the blocking students) than an individually rational mechanism ϕ if
(i) for each problem, there are at least as many blocking students of the outcome
of ϕ as there are of the outcome of ϕ′, and
(ii) there is a problem where there are more blocking students of the outcome of ϕ
than the outcome of ϕ′.
Fairness by counting is a stronger notion than stability considered earlier. If a
mechanism ϕ′ is more fair by counting than ϕ, then for each problem where ϕ induces
a stable matching, i.e., there is no blocking student, ϕ′ also necessarily induces a stable
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matching. Our main result with this concept is a strengthening of the comparison
between different constraints of the Gale-Shapley mechanism.
We illustrate the intuition using the example below.
Example 2. Let I = {i1, . . . , i5} and S = {s1, . . . , s4}. Let (P,, q) be a problem
where each school has one seat, and the remaining components are specified as follows.
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 Pi4 Pi5 s1 s2 s3 s4
s1 s1 s2 s3 s3 i3 i2 i1 i5
s2 s2 s1 s1 s4 i1 i4 i5
...
s3 s3 s3 s2
...
...
...
...
Let us compare the mechanisms GS2 and GS1. We have
GS2(P,, q) =
(
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5
∅ s2 s1 ∅ s3
)
where student i1 is the unique blocking student for the matching under (P,, q). In-
deed, she is unmatched, finds s3 acceptable while she has a higher priority at s3 than
i5. Let us shorten the reported list only for student i2. Then,
GS2(P 1i2 , P−i2 ,, q) =
(
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5
s1 ∅ s2 ∅ s3
)
.
As a result of this replacement, there are three types of students, given their status
in the previous matching. First, student i2 — who was matched — became a blocking
student. Second, student i1 — who was a blocking student — is not a blocking student
for the new matching. Finally, student i4 is a new blocking student.
The intuition of this result is that by shortening the schools listed by student i2,
she is worse off while the other students are weakly better off. First, she is a blocking
student for the new matching. Second, student i1 is not a blocking student for the
new matching, though she was a blocking student for the old matching. But a new
blocking student appears so that there are two blocking students in total.
This turns out to be true in general. When a student shortens the list, the set of
blocking students changes, but the size of this set never decreases (and sometimes
increases). And when all students shorten their lists, we get the following result.
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Theorem 4. Suppose that there are at least two schools and let k > ` where k is less
than the number of schools and ` ≥ 1. The constrained Gale-Shapley mechanism GSk
is more fair by counting than GS`.
See the appendix for the proof. Next, we show that the other comparisons do
not extend to this stronger criterion. The first example shows that the constrained
Boston mechanism is not comparable to the constrained GS.
Example 3 (Constrained Boston and GS). Let n ≥ 7, I = {i1, ..., in} and S =
{s1, . . . , s5}. Let (P,, q) be a problem where each school has one seat and the re-
maining components are specified as follows.
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 Pi4 Pi5 . . . Pin−1 Pin s, s∈S
s1 s2 s3 s1 s1 s1 s1 s4 i1
...
...
... s4 s2 s2 s2 s5 i2
s5 s3 s3 s3
... i3
... s5 s5 s5 i4
∅ ∅ ∅ i5
...
in
The outcomes of β3 and GS3 for this problem are specified as follows:
β3(P,, q) =
(
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 . . . in−1 in
s1 s2 s3 s5 ∅ . . . ∅ s4
)
and
GS3(P,, q) =
(
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 . . . in−1 in
s1 s2 s3 s4 ∅ . . . ∅ s5
)
.
Let us compare the number of blocking students for the two outcomes. On one
hand, student i4 is the only blocking student for β3(P,, q). Indeed, the pair (i4, s4)
blocks β3(P,, q) under (P,, q). On the other hand, students i5, . . . , in−1 are all
blocking students for GS3(P,, q) because they are unmatched, each of them prefers
school s5 to being unmatched, and has higher priority than in under s5. Since n ≥ 7,
there are at least two blocking students for GS3(P,, q). Therefore, there are more
blocking students for GS3(P,, q) than β3(P,, q). Under Theorem 1, there is a
problem where GS3 is stable but not β3.
Next, the symmetric Chinese parallel mechanisms are also not comparable in terms
of fairness by counting.
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Example 4 (Chinese parallel). We consider Example 3. Consider the Chinese mech-
anisms Ch(1) = β and Ch(3) and note that for the problem (P,, q) specified in that
example, Ch(1)(P,, q) = β3(P,, q) and Ch(3)(P,, q) = GS3(P,, q). According
to the conclusion in Example 3, there are more blocking students for Ch(3)(P,, q)
than Ch(1)(P,, q). According to Chen and Kesten (2017), there is a problem where
Ch(3) produces a stable outcome but Ch(1) does not.
The overall ranking with respect to the two criteria are presented in Table 1. In
the next section, we investigate the relationship between stability and manipulability.
Remark. Dogan and Ehlers (2020a) introduced a criterion where they compare mech-
anisms by the inclusion of the blocking pairs and blocking students. However, these
criteria are stronger than fairness by counting and will lead to negative results for our
comparisons. To see this, consider Example 3. In this example, (i5, s5) is a blocking
pair of SD4(P,, q) but not β4(P,, q). In addition, (i4, s4) is a blocking pair of
β4(P,, q) but not SD4(P,, q).
For the comparison between different constrained Gale-Shapley, consider Example
2. There, (i1, s3) is a blocking pair of GS2(P,, q) but not GS1(P,, q). In addition,
(i2, s2) is a blocking pair of GS1(P,, q) but not GS2(P,, q).
4. Stability and manipulability
In this section, we will elucidate the relation between blocking students and manip-
ulating students, i.e., those who may benefit from misrepresenting their preferences
to the mechanisms. We define those students below as well as the definition of a
non-manipulable mechanism.
Definition 3. Let ϕ be a mechanism.
(i) Student i is a manipulating student of ϕ at (P,, q) if there is a preference
relation Pˆi such that
ϕi(Pˆi, P−i,, q) Pi ϕi(P,, q).
(ii) The mechanism ϕ is not manipulable at (P,, q) if there is no manipulating
student of ϕ at (P,, q).
It turns out that there is a strong relation between blocking students and manipulat-
ing students for the constrained Boston mechanism and the constrained Gale-Shapley
mechanism. Interestingly, these relations for the two mechanisms are reversed.
Theorem 5. Let (P,, q) be a problem and k > 1. Then,
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(i) every blocking student of the outcome βk(P,, q) of the constrained Boston
mechanism is a manipulating student of βk at (P,, q) and
(ii) every manipulating student of the constrained Gale-Shapley mechanism GSk at
(P,, q) is a blocking student of GSk(P,, q).
See the appendix for the proof. These results have important implications for the
relation between manipulability and stability. To see this, suppose that there is no
manipulating student for the constrained Boston mechanism βk at (P,, q). Then,
under part (i) of this theorem, there is not a blocking student of βk(P,, q). Since
βk is individually rational, then βk(P,, q) is stable. Suppose now that there is no
blocking student for GSk(P,, q). Since GSk is individually rational, this means that
GSk(P,, q) is stable. Then, there is no manipulating student for GSk at (P,, q).
That is, GSk is not manipulable at (P,, q). We summarize these results in the
following corollary; see the appendix for the proof.
βk not
manipulable
GSk stable
GSk not manipulable
βk stable
Figure 1. The set inclusion relations of the problems where GSk and βk
are stable or not manipulable.
Corollary 1. Let (P,, q) be a problem and k > 1. (i) Suppose that the constrained
Boston mechanism βk is not manipulable at (P,, q). Then, βk(P,, q) is stable.
(ii) Suppose that the constrained Gale-Shapley mechanism GSk(P,, q) is stable.
Then, GSk is not manipulable at (P,, q).
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GSk not
manipulable
GSk+1 stable
GSk+1 not
manipulable
GSk stable
Figure 2. The set inclusion relations of the problems where GSk and GSk+1
are stable or not manipulable.
Note that there are problems where the reverse of each of these results does not
hold. See Example 5 below for the constrained Gale-Shapley mechanism. To see
a counterexample of the reverse of the case (i), consider a problem (P,, q) where
students have a common ranking of schools, have ranked k schools acceptable and
where each school has one seat. Then, βk(P,, q) is stable. However, the student
who has received her third ranked school is better off top ranking the school she has
ranked second as her top choice.
The diagrams illustrate the structure of the interplay between stability and manip-
ulability for the constrained Boston and the constrained Gale-Shapley mechanisms.
An implication of the latter results is a manipulability comparison introduced by
Pathak and So¨nmez (2013). Under part (i) of Corollary 1, when the constrained
Boston mechanism is not manipulable then it is stable. By Theorem 1, the constrained
Gale-Shapley mechanism is also stable. By part (ii) of Corollary 1, the constrained
Gale-Shapley mechanism is not manipulable. This is the comparison established by
Pathak and So¨nmez (2013).
Corollary 2. (Pathak and So¨nmez, 2013). Let (P,, q) be a problem, k > 1 and
suppose that the constrained Boston mechanism βk is not manipulable at (P,, q).
Then, the constrained Gale-Shapley mechanism GSk is not manipulable at (P,, q).
Another implication is for the serial dictatorship mechanism. The manipulation
strategy under the constrained GS is to include an acceptable school in the list. But
when the constrained GS is stable, all the seats of such a school are assigned to
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higher priority students, and such a manipulation does not help. This implies that
constrained serial dictatorship mechanism is non-manipulable and stable for the same
set of problems.
Proposition 2. Let (P,, q) be a problem and k > 1. The constrained serial dicta-
torship mechanism SDk is stable if and only if it is not manipulable at (P,, q).
See the appendix for the proof. In general, the constrained Gale-Shapley mech-
anism may be unstable while not manipulable. We illustrate this in the following
example.
Example 5. Let I = {i1, . . . , i4} and S = {s1, . . . , s4}. Let (P,, q) be a problem
where each school has one seat and the remaining components are specified as follows.
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 Pi4 s1 s2 s3 s4
s1 s1 s2 s3 i1 i4 i3
...
... s2 s3 s2
... i3 i2
s3
...
... i2 i4
∅ i1 i1
Let us consider the constrained Gale-Shapley mechanism GS2. We have
GS2(P,, q) =
(
i1 i2 i3 i4
s1 ∅ s2 s3
)
.
This matching is not stable under (P,, q) because student i2 is unmatched, finds
school s3 acceptable while student i4 is matched to it and i2 s2 i4. We claim that GS2
is not manipulable at (P,, q). Only student i2 could benefit from misrepresenting her
preferences to the mechanism GS2 because each of the other students is matched to
her most-preferred school. Let P s3i2 be a preference relation where student i2 has ranked
only school s3 acceptable. Then,
GS2(P s3i2 , P−i2 ,, q) =
(
i1 i2 i3 i4
s1 ∅ s3 s2
)
,
that is, student i2 remains unmatched even by ranking school s3 first. (It is easy
to verify that any other manipulation also leaves i2 unmatched.) Therefore, GS2 is
not manipulable at (P,, q). The intuition is that this ranking initiates a chain of
rejections which returns to this student. Student i2 becomes a so-called “interrupter”
when she ranks school s3 first (Kesten, 2010).
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We also establish another direct corollary of Theorem 5 with two additional results.
We show that when switching from constrained Boston to constrained GS, of from
the constrained GS to a longer list, the mechanism becomes more fair by stability
and less manipulable.
Corollary 3. Let (P,, q) be a problem.
(i) Let k > 1 and suppose that the constrained Boston mechanism βk is stable
at (P,, q). Then, the constrained Gale-Shapley mechanism GSk is stable and not
manipulable at (P,, q).
(ii) Let k > ` > 1 and suppose that the constrained Gale-Shapley mechanism GS`
is stable at (P,, q). Then, the mechanism GSk is stable and not manipulable at
(P,, q).
Finally, we partially restore the comparisons for the First-Preference-First mech-
anism. Although the constrained First-Preference-First mechanism and the con-
strained Gale-Shapley mechanism are not comparable by manipulability (Bonkoungou
and Nesterov, 2020) and by fairness by stability (Example 1), there is a surprising
interplay between the two concepts.
Proposition 3. Let (P,, q) be a problem, k > 1 and suppose that the constrained
First-Preference-First mechanism FPF k is stable under (P,, q). Then, the con-
strained Gale-Shapley mechanism GSk is not manipulable at (P,, q).
See the appendix for the proof.
This result helps to evaluate the reforms in England, where FPF k was replaced by
GSk. Even though for some problems the reform was unsuccessful in one of the two
dimensions — decreasing fairness by stability (Example 1) or increase manipulability
(Pathak and So¨nmez, 2013; Bonkoungou and Nesterov, 2020) — the reform could not
be unsuccessful in both dimensions.
To sum up the results of this section, stability and manipulability are logically
related, and the relationship depends on the mechanism.
5. Conclusions
In response to objections, many school districts around the world have recently
reformed there admissions systems. The main reason for these objections was that
the mechanisms were unfair and manipulable. Yet, the mechanisms remained unfair
and manipulable even after the reforms. We used two criteria and showed that many
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reforms resulted in more fair matching mechanisms, first by relying on stability and
second by counting and comparing the number of the blocking students.
The reforms concern essentially two major changes. First, they kept the constraint
on the number of schools that each student is allowed to report but replaced the
Boston mechanism (or a hybrid between Gale-Shapley and Boston mechanism) with
the Gale-Shapley’s student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Second, some
school districts extended the number of schools that each student is allowed to report
but kept the Gale-Shapley mechanism. Our findings support these reforms, as well
as such changes in the future.
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Appendix: Proofs
The following result from the literature will be useful throughout the appendix.
This result is known as the rural hospital theorem.
Lemma 2 (Rural hospital theorem). (Roth, 1986). Let (P,, q) be a problem, ν and
µ two stable matchings. Then,
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(i) the same set of students are matched under ν and µ and
(ii) each school is matched to the same number of students under ν and µ.
Proposition 3: Let (P,, q) be a problem, k > 1 and suppose that the constrained
First-Preference-First mechanism FPF k is stable at (P,, q). Then, the constrained
Gale-Shapley mechanism GSk is not manipulable (P,, q).
Proof. We first establish two claims.
Claim 1: Suppose that student i is matched to school s under GSk(P,, q) and let
P si be a preference relation where she has ranked only school s as an acceptable choice.
Then, she is matched to school s under GSk(P si , P−i,, q).
Suppose that GSki (P,, q) = s. As shown by Roth (1982), GSi(P k,, q) = s
implies that GSi(P si , P k−i,, q) = s. Since k > 1, the truncation of P si after the k’th
acceptable school is nothing but P si . Thus, GSki (P si , P−i,, q) = s.
Claim 2: Suppose that student i can manipulate GSk at the problem (P,, q). Then
she is unmatched under GSk(P,, q).
This result follows from Pathak and So¨nmez (2013).
We are now ready to prove the proposition. Let (P,, q) be a problem and suppose
that µ = FPF k(P,, q) is stable under (P,, q). Under Claim 2, it is enough to show
that an unmatched student under GSk(P,, q) has no profitable misrepresentation.
Because GSk is individually rational, under Claim 1, we need to restrict ourselves to
manipulation by top ranking a school first. Since µ is stable under (P,, q), then µ
is also stable under (P k,, q). Since GSk is individually rational, we need to check
that there is no blocking pair. Suppose, to the contrary, that a pair (i, s) is a blocking
pair for µ under (P k,, q). Then, s P ki µ(i) and either (i) school s has an empty seat
under µ or (ii) there is a student j such that µ(j) = s and i s j. Note that s P ki µ(i)
implies that s Pi µ(i). Therefore, (i, s) is also a blocking pair for µ under (P,, q).
This conclusion contradicts our assumption that µ is stable under (P,, q).
Therefore, µ is stable under (P k,, q). Since GS(P k,, q) is the student-optimal
stable matching under (P k,, q),
(1) for each student i, GSi(P k,, q) Rki µ(i).
In line with Lemma 2, the same number of students are matched under µ and
GS(P k,, q). Let i be a student and s a school and suppose that i is unmatched
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under GS(P k,, q) and that s Pi GSi(P k,, q). Then, student i is also unmatched
under µ. Thus, s Pi µ(i) = ∅. Because µ is stable under (P,, q), this implies
that every student in µ−1(s) has higher priority than i under s. Let P si denote a
preference relation where i has ranked only school s acceptable. Since µ is stable
under (P k,, q), it is also stable under (P si , P k−i,, q). Under Lemma 2, the set of
matched students is the same at all stable matchings. Thus, student i is also un-
matched under GS(P si , P k−i,, q). Then, under Claim 1, there is no strategy P ′i such
that GSki (P ′i , P−i) = s. Thus, the mechanism GSk is not manipulable at (P,, q). 
Theorem 1: Suppose that there are at least three schools and let k > 1. The constrained
Gale-Shapley mechanism GSk is more fair by stability than the constrained Boston
mechanism βk.
Proof. The Boston mechanism is a special case of the First-Preference-First mecha-
nism when every school is a first-preference-first school. Let (P,, q) be a problem
and suppose that βk(P,, q) is stable under (P,, q). As stated in equation 1, each
student finds the outcome GSk(P,, q) at least as good as βk(P,, q) under P k. We
also know that the Boston mechanism is Pareto efficient, that is, for each problem
there is no other matching that each student finds at least as good as its outcome (Ab-
dulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003). Therefore, the matching βk(P,, q) = β(P k,, q)
is Pareto efficient under P k. Thus, GSk(P,, q) = βk(P,, q) and consequently,
GSk(P,, q) is stable under (P,, q).
We construct a problem where GSk is stable but not βk. Since there are at least
two schools and more students than schools, let s1, s2 be two distinct schools and i1, i2
and i3 three students. Let (P,, q) be a problem where each school has one seat and
the remaining components are specified as follows.
Pi 6=3 P3 s∈S
s1 s2 i1
s2 s1 i2
∅ ∅ i3
...
Since k ≥ 2, GSk(P,, q) = GS(P,, q) is stable under (P,, q). However, the
matching
βk(P,, q) =
(
i1 i3 i 6= 1, 3
s1 s2 ∅
)
is not stable because the pair (i2, s2) blocks it under (P,, q).
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
Proposition 1: Suppose that there are at least two schools and at least one first-
preference-first school, and let k > 1. The constrained serial dictatorship mechanism
SDk is more fair by stability than the constrained First-Preference-First mechanism
FPF k.
Proof. Let (P,, q) be a problem where schools have a common priority order and
suppose that FPF k(P,, q) is stable under (P,, q). Under equation 1, each student
finds the outcome SDk(P,, q) at least as good as FPF k(P,, q) under P k. With a
common priority order, there is a unique stable matching under (P,, q) which is also
Pareto efficient under P . Therefore, because FPF k(P,, q) is stable under (P,, q),
we have FPF k(P,, q) = SD(P,, q).
Next, every student who is matched under SD(P,, q) is matched to one of her top
k-ranked acceptable schools. Therefore, SD(P,, q) = FPF k(P,, q) is also Pareto
efficient under P k. Thus, equation 1 implies that SDk(P,, q) = FPF k(P,, q) and
consequently, SDk(P,, q) is stable under (P,, q).
We can adapt the example provided in the proof of Theorem 1 to show that there
is a problem where SDk is stable but not FPF k. 
Lemma 1: Let (P,, q) be a problem and k > 1. Then GSk(P,, q) is stable if and
only if GSk(P,, q) = GS(P,, q).
Proof. The “if” part is straightforward because GS(P,, q) = GSk(P,, q) is the
student-optimal stable matching under (P,, q).
The “only if” part. Suppose that GSk(P,, q) is stable under (P,, q). Let
N = {i ∈ I|GSi(P,, q) = ∅} denote the set of students who are unmatched un-
der GS(P,, q).
Step 1 : For each i ∈ N , GSi(P,, q) = GSi(P k,, q).
This follows from the assumption that GS(P k,, q) is stable and Lemma 2.
Step 2 : For each i ∈ I \N , GSi(P,, q) = GSi(P k,, q).
Let i ∈ I \ N . Because GS(P,, q) is the student-optimal stable matching under
(P,, q),
(2) GSi(P,, q) Ri GSki (P,, q).
REFORMS AND FAIRNESS 25
Note that for each student j ∈ N , the preference relation Pj can be interpreted as
if she has extended her list of acceptable schools from P kj . As shown by Gale and
Sotomayor (1985), when a subset of students extend their list of acceptable schools,
none of the remaining students are better off. Therefore,
(3) for each student j ∈ I \N, GSj(P kN , P−N ,, q) Rj GSj(P,, q).
Because GS is individually rational under P , under equation 3, student i is also
matched under GS(P kN , P−N ,, q). Next, since GS(P k,, q) is stable under (P,, q),
by assumption, Lemma 2 implies that the same set of students are matched under
both GS(P,, q) and GS(P k,, q). Therefore, i is also matched under GS(P k,, q).
Next, note that the students in I \ N have extended their list of acceptable schools
under (P kN , P−N) from P k. Then, at the end of the Gale-Shapley algorithm for the
problem (P k,, q), each of the students in I \N is accepted by a school. The school
that each of them has listed below the school that has accepted her at this step of the
algorithm and how she has ranked them do not affect the outcome of the algorithm.
Thus,
GS(P k,, q) = GS(P kN , P−N ,, q).
This equation and equation 3 imply that GSi(P k,, q) Ri GSi(P,, q). Since the
preference relation Pi is strict, this relation and equation 2 imply that
GSi(P
k,, q) = GSi(P,, q).
Finally, by Step 1 and Step 2, the matching is the same for each student under
GSk(P,, q) and GS(P,, q), the desired conclusion. 
Corollary 1: Let (P,, q) be a problem and k > 1.
(i) Suppose that the constrained Boston mechanism βk is not manipulable at the
problem (P,, q). Then, βk(P,, q) is stable.
(ii) Suppose that the constrained Gale-Shapley mechanism GSk is stable under
(P,, q). Then, GSk is not manipulable at (P,, q).
Proof. We prove (i) by the contraposition. Suppose that βk(P,, q) is not stable
under (P,, q). Since βk is individually rational, there is a pair (i, s) of a student
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and a school which blocks βk(P,, q) under (P,, q). In assent with (i) of Theorem
5, student i is a manipulating student of βk at (P,, q). Thus, βk is manipulable at
(P,, q).
We now prove part (ii). Suppose that GSk(P,, q) is stable under (P,, q). As
shown in Lemma 1, we have GSk(P,, q) = GS(P,, q). As shown by Pathak and
So¨nmez (2013), only unmatched students could benefit from misrepresenting their
preferences toGSk. Let i be an unmatched student under µ = GSk(P,, q), s a school
such that s Pi µ(i) and P si a preference relation where she has ranked only school s
as an acceptable school. Because µ is stable under (P,, q), each student in µ−1(s)
has a higher priority than i under s. Therefore, µ is also stable under (P si , P k−i,
, q). Under Lemma 2, student i is unmatched under both µ and GS(P si , P k−i,, q).
Corresponding to Claim 1, there is no strategy P ′i such that student i is matched to
school s under GSk(P ′i , P−i,, q). Therefore, student i cannot manipulate GSk at
(P,, q). Since the choice of i is arbitrary, GSk is not manipulable at (P,, q). 
Theorem 4: Let k > ` and suppose that there are at least k schools. The constrained
Gale-Shapley mechanism GSk is more fair by counting than GS`.
Proof. Let (P,, q) be a problem. The strategy is to start from GS(P k,, q) and
replace the preference relations in P k one at a time, with a preference relation in P `
for the corresponding student until we get GS(P `,, q). We prove the theorem by
showing that the number of blocking students is not decreasing after each replacement.
First, we prove two lemmas. The first lemma will be used at some steps of the
second. The second will be the main part to proving the theorem.
Lemma 3. Let N be a subset of students and µ = GS(P `N , P k−N ,, q). Any blocking
student for µ under (P,, q) is unmatched.
Proof. We prove the lemma by the contradiction. Suppose, to the contrary, that some
student i is a blocking student for µ = GS(P `N , P k−N ,, q) under (P,, q) such that
µ(i) = s for some school s. Then, there is a school s′ such that s′ Pi µ(i) and either
(i) |µ−1(s′)|< qs′ or (ii) there is a student j such that µ(j) = s′ and i s′ j. Let
x ∈ {`, k} be such that x = ` if i ∈ N and x = k if i /∈ N . Since µ(i) = s, school s
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is one of the top x acceptable schools under Pi. Thus s′ P xi µ(i) = s. This relation,
together with the case (i) or (ii) imply that the pair (i, s′) blocks the matching µ
under (P `N , P k−N ,, q). This conclusion contradicts the fact that µ is stable under
(P `N , P
k
−N ,, q).

The next lemma is the main part for proving the theorem. For simplicity, let
Pˆ = (P `N , P
k
−N), i /∈ N and denote
µ =: GS(Pˆ ,, q)
and,
ν = GS(P `i , Pˆ−i,, q).
Lemma 4. There are at least as many blocking students for ν than µ under (P,, q).
Proof. Let n be the number of blocking students for µ under (P,, q). We show that
there are at least n blocking students for ν under (P,, q).
Let us first show that every student other than i finds ν at least as good as µ under
Pˆ . To see this, note that student i has extended her list of acceptable schools under
Pˆi = P
k
i from P `i . As shown by Gale and Sotomayor (1985), after this extension no
student, other than i, is better off. That is,
(4) for each student j 6= i, ν(j) Rˆj µ(j).
We divide the rest of the proof into two cases. In the first case, student i is unmatched
under µ. For this case, we will show that any blocking student for µ under (P,, q) is
also a blocking student for ν under (P,, q). In the second case, student i is matched
under µ. We will show that either µ = ν (in case i is also matched under ν), or i is
a blocking student for ν.
Case I: Suppose that student i is unmatched under µ, that is, µ(i) = ∅.
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We first show that ν(i) = ∅. Suppose, to the contrary, that ν(i) = s, for some
school s. Then s is one of the top ` acceptable schools of student i under Pi. Since
k > `, school s is also one of the top k acceptable schools under Pˆi = P ki . Therefore,
GSi(P
`
i , Pˆ−i,, q) = s Pˆi µ(i) = GSi(Pˆ ,, q) = ∅.
This relation shows that student i is better off misrepresenting her preference to the
Gale-Shapley mechanism, contradicting the fact that this mechanism is not manip-
ulable (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982). Therefore, ν(i) = µ(i) = ∅. This
equality together with equation 4 imply that each student finds the matching ν at
least as good as µ under Pˆ . Because µ = GS(Pˆ ,, q) is stable under (Pˆ ,, q), it is
also stable under (P `i , Pˆ−i,, q). To see this, note that student i is unmatched under
µ and that for each school s such that s P `i µ(i), school s does not have an empty
seat under µ and every student in µ−1(s) has higher priority than i under s. Since
ν = GS(P `−i, Pˆ−i,, q) is also stable under (P `−i, Pˆ−i,, q), under Lemma 2, we have
the following conclusion.
Conclusion: (a) the same set of students are matched (unmatched) under ν and µ
and (b) every school is matched to the same number of students under both ν and µ.
Let us now prove that every blocking student for µ under (P,, q) is also a blocking
student for ν under (P,, q). Let j be a blocking student for µ under (P,, q). There
are two cases.
Case I.1: j = i
Then, there is a school s such that s Pi µ(i) and either (i) school s has an empty
seat under µ or (ii) there is a student j′ such that µ(j′) = s and i s j′.
Consider the case (i) where school s has an empty seat under µ. Then, under part
(b) of the previous conclusion, s has an empty seat under ν. Since ν(i) = ∅, i is a
blocking student for ν under (P,, q).
Consider the case (ii) where there is a student j′ such that µ(j′) = s and i s j′.
Without loss of generality, suppose that school s does not have an empty seat under
µ. Then, under part (b) of the previous conclusion, school s does not have an empty
seat under ν. Suppose that ν(j′) = s. Since ν(i) = ∅ and i s j′, then the pair (i, s)
blocks ν under (P,, q) and i is a blocking student for ν under (P,, q). Suppose
that ν(j′) 6= s. Since |ν−1(s)|= qs, there is j′′ ∈ ν−1(s) \ µ−1(s). Under equation 4,
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s = ν(j′′) Pˆj′′ µ(j′′).
Since µ = GS(Pˆ ,, q) is stable under (Pˆ ,, q) and µ(j′) = s, then j′ s j′′. Because
s is transitive, i s j′ and j′ s j′′ imply that i s j′′. Since s Pi ν(i) = ∅, the pair
(i, s) blocks ν under (P,, q) and i is a blocking student for ν under (P,, q).
Case I.2 : j 6= i
There is a school s such that s Pj µ(j) and either (i) school s has an empty seat
under µ or (ii) there is a student j′ such that µ(j′) = s and j s j′. As shown
in Lemma 3, because student j is a blocking student for µ under (P,, q), we have
µ(j) = ∅.
Let us consider the case (i). Under Lemma 2, student j is also unmatched under
ν and school s has an empty seat under ν. Thus, j is a blocking student for ν under
(P,, q).
Second, consider (ii) where there is a student j′ such that µ(j′) = s and j s j′.
If ν(j′) = s, then (j, s) is a blocking pair of ν under (P,, q) and j is a blocking
student for ν under (P,, q). Without loss of generality, suppose that |µ−1(s)|= qs
and ν(j′) 6= s. According to part (b) of the above conclusion, |ν−1(s)|= qs. Then,
there is a student j′′ ∈ ν−1(s) \ µ−1(s). Because µ(i) = ∅, we have j′′ 6= i, and by
equation 4,
s = ν(j′′) Pˆj′′ µ(j′′).
Since µ is stable under (Pˆ ,, q) and µ(j′) = s, then this equation implies that
j′ s j′′. Because s is transitive, j s j′ and j′ s j′′ imply that j s j′′. Since
s Pj ν(j) = ∅, then the pair (j, s) blocks ν under (P,, q) and j is a blocking student
for ν under (P,, q).
In conclusion, every blocking student for µ under (P,, q) is also a blocking student
for ν under (P,, q). There are n blocking students for ν under (P,, q).
Case II: Student i is matched under µ.
If student i is also matched under ν = DA(P `i , Pˆ−i,, q), then ν = µ. To see this,
let ν(i) = s for some school s. School s is one of the top ` acceptable schools of
student i under Pi. The Gale-Shapley mechanism is invariant to the modification of
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the preferences of the students for the part below their outcomes. We know that P ki
is one such modification of P ` below school s. Thus, ν = µ. We now consider the
case where i is not matched under ν.
Suppose that student i is unmatched under ν. The strategy of the proof is to show
that i is a blocking student for ν under (P,, q) and that there are also at least n− 1
other blocking students for ν under (P,, q). We depict the flow of these students in
Figure 3.
Step 1 : Student i is a blocking student for ν under (P,, q).
Recall that we assumed that student i is matched under µ = GS(Pˆ ,, q), where
Pˆ = (P `N , P
k
−N) and i /∈ N . Let s = µ(i). School s is one of the top k acceptable
schools under Pi. Since ν(i) = ∅, if school s has an empty seat under ν, then
clearly the pair (i, s) blocks ν under (P,, q) and i is a blocking student for ν under
(P,, q). Suppose that |ν−1(s)|= qs. Since µ(i) = s and ν(i) = ∅, there is a student
j ∈ ν−1(s) \ µ−1(s). By equation 4,
i
≤ 1
Unmatched Matched
Blocking
students
Figure 3. Case II: flow of students across matched, unmatched, and block-
ing status, from µ to ν: at most one student can leave the blocking status to
the matched status; student i left the matched status to the blocking status,
and no student can leave the blocking status and remain unmatched.
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s = ν(j) Pˆj µ(j).
Since µ is stable under (Pˆ ,, q) and µ(i) = s, we have i s j. Therefore, the pair
(i, s) blocks ν under (P,, q) and i is a blocking student for ν under (P,, q).
Step 2 : Every blocking student for µ under (P,, q) who is unmatched under ν is
also a blocking student for ν under (P,, q).
Let j be a blocking student for µ under (P,, q) and suppose that she is unmatched
under ν. There is a school s such that s Pj µ(j) and either (i) school s has an empty
seat under µ or (ii) there is a student j′ such that µ(j′) = s and j s j′. In addition,
because j is the blocking student of µ under (P,, q), by Lemma 3, we have µ(j) = ∅.
Let us consider the case (i) where school s has an empty seat under µ. We also
show that s has an empty seat under ν. Assume otherwise. Then, there is j′ ∈
ν−1(s) \ µ−1(s). We know that student i is unmatched under ν. Thus, j′ 6= i. Under
equation 4, s = ν(j′) Pˆj′ µ(j′). This contradicts the fact that µ is stable under
(Pˆ ,, q) because s has an empty seat under µ. Therefore, s has an empty seat under
ν. Then the pair (j, s) blocks ν under (P,, q) and j is a blocking student for ν under
(P,, q).
Let us now consider the case (ii) where there is a student j′ such that µ(j′) = s and
j s j′. If school s has an empty seat under ν, then because student j is unmatched
under ν, she is a blocking student for ν under (P,, q). Suppose that school s does
not have an empty seat under ν. If ν(j′) = s then the pair (j, s) blocks ν under
(P,, q) and j is a blocking student for ν under (P,, q) because ν(j) = ∅ and
j s j′. Suppose that ν(j′) 6= s. Because school s does not have an empty seat under
ν, there is j′′ ∈ ν−1(s)\µ−1(s). Since student i is unmatched under ν, we have j′′ 6= i.
By equation 4, we have s = ν(j′′) Pˆj′′ µ(j′′). Since µ is stable under (Pˆ ,, q), the
equation and the fact that µ(j′) = s imply that j′ s j′′. Because s is transitive,
j s j′ and j′ s j′′ imply that j s j′′. Since s Pj ν(j) = ∅, then the pair (j, s)
blocks ν under (P,, q) and j is a blocking student for ν under (P,, q).
Step 3 : Every student but i who is matched under µ is also matched under ν.
Suppose that for some student j 6= i and some school s, µ(j) = s. Under equation
4, we have ν(j) Rˆj µ(j) = s. Since µ is individually rational under Pˆ , ν(j) 6= ∅.
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Step 4 : There are at least n blocking students for ν under (P,, q).
Let j be a blocking student for µ under (P,, q) who is not a blocking student for
ν under (P,, q). Then, j is matched under ν. Otherwise, according to step 2, she
is also a blocking student for ν under (P,, q). We prove, more generally, that there
are at most one student who is unmatched under µ but matched under ν. To do that,
we compare for each school the number of students matched to it under µ and ν.
Let s be a school. Suppose that it does not have an empty seat under µ. Then,
we have |ν−1(s)|≤ |µ−1(s)|= qs. Suppose now that s has an empty seat under µ.
Suppose that there is j′ ∈ ν−1(s) \ µ−1(s). Then, because student i is unmatched
under ν, j′ 6= i. By equation 4,
s = ν(j′) Pˆj′ µ(j′).
This contradicts the fact that µ is stable under (Pˆ ,, q) because school s has an
empty seat under µ. Thus, there is no student matched to school s under ν but not
under µ. Therefore, |ν−1(s)|≤ |µ−1(s)|. We conclude that no school is matched to
more students under ν than under µ. Thus,
(5)
∑
s∈S
|ν−1(s)|≤
∑
s∈S
|µ−1(s)|.
By step 3, all students, but student i, who are matched under µ are also matched
under ν. Therefore, the set of students who are matched under ν consists of the
following students:
• the students who are matched under µ, except student i and
• the students who are unmatched under µ but matched under ν.
Let x denote the number of the students who are unmatched under µ but matched
under ν. Then, we have
∑
s∈S
|ν−1(s)|=
∑
s∈S
|µ−1(s)|−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
number of students
matched under µ and ν
+ x,
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where the first two expressions on the right-hand side indicate that we subtracted
student i from those who are matched under µ. By rearranging this equation, we get∑
s∈S
|ν−1(s)|−
∑
s∈S
|µ−1(s)|= x− 1 ≤ 0,
where the inequality follows from equation 5. Thus, there is at most one student who
is unmatched under µ but matched under ν. According to Lemma 3, all blocking
students for µ under (P,, q) are unmatched under µ. Then, there is at most one
blocking student for µ under (P,, q) who is matched under ν. In assent with this
result together with step 2, there is at most one blocking student for µ under (P,, q)
who is not a blocking student for ν under (P,, q). Among the n blocking students
for µ under (P,, q), at most one of them is not a blocking student for ν under
(P,, q). Therefore, excluding student i, there are at least n − 1 blocking students
for ν under (P,, q). Since student i is also a blocking student for ν under (P,, q),
there are at least n blocking students for ν under (P,, q).

We complete the proof of the theorem by applying the lemma sequentially. Let n be
the number of the blocking students for GS(P k,, q) under (P,, q). For simplicity,
let I = {1, 2, . . . , |I|}. Under Lemma 4, there are at least n blocking students for
µ1 = GS(P
`
1 , P
k
−1,, q)
under (P,, q). By the same lemma, compared to µ1, there are at least n blocking
students of the matching
µ2 = GS(P
`
{1,2}, P
k
−{1,2},, q)
under (P,, q). With a repeated replacement of the remaining components of P k with
their counterparts in P `, we draw the conclusion that there are at least n blocking
students for GS(P `,, q) under (P,, q).
Finally, we describe a problem where the outcome of GS` has more blocking stu-
dents than the outcome of GSk. Let (P,, q) be a problem where each school has one
seat, each student has k acceptable schools and such that students have a common
ranking of schools. Then, GSk(P,, q) = GS(P,, q). Thus GSk(P,, q) is stable
under (P,, q). Let s be the school that students have ranked at the k’th position
starting from the top. Since there are more students than schools and k > `, at least
one student is not matched under GS`(P,, q) and no student is matched to school
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s even though every student prefers it to being unmatched. Then, there is at least
one blocking student for GS`(P,, q). Therefore, there are more blocking students
for GS`(P,, q) than GSk(P,, q) under (P,, q). 
Proposition 2: Let (P,, q) be a problem and k > 1. The constrained serial dictator-
ship mechanism SDk is stable if and only if it is not manipulable at (P,, q).
Proof. As shown by Bonkoungou and Nesterov (2020), SDk is not manipulable at
(P,, q) if and only if SDk(P,, q) = SD(P,, q). Suppose that SDk(P,, q) is
stable. Then, according to Lemma 1, SDk(P,, q) = SD(P,, q) and thus SDk
is not manipulable at (P,, q). Suppose that SDk is not manipulable at (P,, q).
Then, SDk(P,, q) = SD(P,, q) and thus stable. 
Theorem 5: Let (P,, q) be a problem and k > 1.
(i) Every blocking student of βk(P,, q) is a manipulating student of the con-
strained Boston mechanism βk at (P,, q).
(ii) Every manipulating student of the constrained Gale-Shapley mechanism GSk
at (P,, q) is a blocking student of GSk(P,, q).
Proof. Proof of (i). Let i be a student and suppose that she is a blocking student
of µ = β(P k,, q). There is a school s such that the pair (i, s) blocks µ under
(P,, q). Then, we have s Pi µ(i) and either (a) school s has an empty seat under
µ or (b) there is a student j such that µ(j) = s and i s j. We claim that student
i did not rank school s first under Pi. Otherwise, school s has rejected student i at
the first step of the Boston algorithm under (P k,, q). This is because k > 1 and
the top ranked schools are considered under βk. This contradicts the assumption
that school s has an empty seat or has accepted student j and i s j. Let P si be
a preference relation where i has ranked school s first. Since s has an empty seat
under βk(P,, q) or has accepted student j and i s j, there are less than qs students
who have ranked school s first under P k and have a higher priority than i under s.
Therefore, βi(P si , P k−i,, q) = s. Since s Pi µ(i), then i is a manipulating student of
βk at (P,, q).
Proof of (ii). We prove this part by contradiction. Suppose that student i is
a manipulating student of GSk at (P,, q) but is not a blocking student for µ =
GSk(P,, q) under (P,, q). By Claim 2 above, i is unmatched under GSk(P,, q).
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Let s be a school such that s Pi µ(i). Then, |µ−1(s)|= qs and every student in µ−1(s)
has higher priority than i unders. Let P si be a preference relation where i has ranked
only school s as an acceptable school. Since µ is stable under (P k,, q), it is also
stable under (P si , P k−i,, q). This follows from the fact that µ(i) = ∅ and that every
student in µ−1(s) has a higher priority than i under s. According to Lemma 2, the
set of unmatched students is the same under µ and GSk(P si , P k−i,, q). Thus, i is also
unmatched under GSk(P si , P k−i,, q). According to Claim 1, there is no misreport by
which i is matched to s. Since s has been chosen arbitrarily, i is not a manipulating
student of GSk at (P,, q). This conclusion contradicts our assumption that student
i is a manipulating student of GSk at (P,, q). 
Theorem 2: Suppose that there are at least three schools and let k > ` where k is less
than the number of schools and ` ≥ 1. Then, the constrained Gale-Shapley mechanism
GSk is more fair by stability than GS`.
Proof. Suppose that GS`(P,, q) is stable under (P,, q). Then, there is no blocking
student for it under (P,, q). According to Theorem 4, there is no blocking student
for GSk(P,, q) under (P,, q). Since GSk(P,, q) is individually rational under P ,
then it is stable under (P,, q).
We described an example in the proof of Theorem 4 where there is a blocking
student (pair) for GS` but not GSk. Since GSk and GS` are individually rational, at
this problem GSk is stable but not GS`. 
